- 34% would report to police if someone close to them were going to join circles supporting terrorism in Syria.
- 4% sympathize with people who take part in suicide bombings to fight injustice.
- 4% sympathize with committing terrorist acts as political protest.
- 32% do not condemn violence against people who mock the Prophet Muhammad: 18% sympathize and 14% take no position.
- 66% fully condemn stoning for adultery.
- 31% accept that a British Muslim man may have more than one wife.
- 23% support introducing sharia law in some areas of Britain.
- 39% agree that wives should always obey their husbands.
- 52% do not believe homosexuality should be legal in Britain.
- 47% do not consider it acceptable for a homosexual person to work as a schoolteacher.
EN
Foreign language speakers by language
Subsidy dependency by origin
Refugee countries: Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria · Middle East: Middle East & North Africa excl. refugee countries, incl. Central Asia · Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries · Western countries: EU/EEA, North America, Australia & similar · Other countries: All remaining foreign countries
Economic contribution by origin group
Refugee countries: Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria · Middle East: Middle East & North Africa excl. refugee countries, incl. Central Asia · Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries · Western countries: EU/EEA, North America, Australia & similar · Other countries: All remaining foreign countries
Unemployment rate by nationality
Share outside labour force by citizenship group
Crime rates by nationality
Net migration by birth country
Statistical correlations
-
Sources and notes
|
SPP
Swedish People's Party
|
31 | +543,274 | +17,525 | +129,258 | AhoLipponen ILipponen IIJäätteenmäki / Vanhanen IVanhanen IVanhanen IIKiviniemiKatainenStubbRinne / MarinMarinOrpo |
|
KOK
National Coalition Party
|
27 | +478,246 | +17,713 | +103,741 | AhoLipponen ILipponen IIVanhanen IIKiviniemiKatainenStubbSipiläOrpo |
|
KESK
Centre Party
|
20 | +327,947 | +16,397 | +67,532 | AhoJäätteenmäki / Vanhanen IVanhanen IVanhanen IIKiviniemiSipiläRinne / MarinMarin |
|
GREENS
Green League
|
20 | +315,420 | +15,771 | +81,653 | Lipponen ILipponen IIVanhanen IIKiviniemiKatainenStubbRinne / MarinMarin |
|
SDP
Social Democratic Party
|
20 | +287,544 | +14,377 | +60,726 | Lipponen ILipponen IIJäätteenmäki / Vanhanen IVanhanen IKatainenStubbRinne / MarinMarin |
|
KD
Christian Democrats
|
11 | +274,117 | +24,920 | +77,598 | AhoKatainenStubbOrpo |
|
LEFT
Left Alliance
|
15 | +226,975 | +15,132 | +54,458 | Lipponen ILipponen IIKatainenRinne / MarinMarin |
|
FP
Finns Party
|
5 | +194,703 | +38,941 | +58,155 | SipiläOrpo |
|
BLUE
Blue Reform
|
2 | +37,832 | +18,916 | +576 | Sipilä |
| 2025 |
Orpo
Petteri Orpo
|
KOKFPSPPKD | 660,800 | +36,851 | 208,661 | +18,909 |
| 2024 |
Orpo
Petteri Orpo
|
KOKFPSPPKD | 623,949 | +52,681 | 189,752 | +14,706 |
| 2023 |
Orpo
Petteri Orpo
|
KOKFPSPPKD | 571,268 | +63,095 | 175,046 | +14,378 |
| 2022 |
Marin
Sanna Marin
|
SDPKESKGREENSLEFTSPP | 508,173 | +38,540 | 160,668 | +12,420 |
| 2021 |
Marin
Sanna Marin
|
SDPKESKGREENSLEFTSPP | 469,633 | +25,602 | 148,248 | +4,016 |
| 2020 |
Marin
Sanna Marin
|
SDPKESKGREENSLEFTSPP | 444,031 | +20,537 | 144,232 | +18,151 |
| 2019 |
Rinne / Marin
Antti Rinne / Sanna Marin
|
SDPKESKGREENSLEFTSPP | 423,494 | +20,875 | 126,081 | +2,056 |
| 2018 |
Sipilä
Juha Sipilä
|
KESKKOKBLUE | 402,619 | +18,496 | 124,025 | −839 |
| 2017 |
Sipilä
Juha Sipilä
|
KESKKOKBLUE | 384,123 | +19,336 | 124,864 | +1,415 |
| 2016 |
Sipilä
Juha Sipilä
|
KESKKOKFP | 364,787 | +24,862 | 123,449 | +2,774 |
| 2015 |
Sipilä
Juha Sipilä
|
KESKKOKFP | 339,925 | +17,214 | 120,675 | +7,388 |
| 2014 |
Stubb
Alexander Stubb
|
KOKSDPGREENSSPPKD | 322,711 | +21,187 | 113,287 | +6,656 |
| 2013 |
Katainen
Jyrki Katainen
|
KOKSDPLEFTGREENSSPPKD | 301,524 | +21,908 | 106,631 | +5,663 |
| 2012 |
Katainen
Jyrki Katainen
|
KOKSDPLEFTGREENSSPPKD | 279,616 | +22,122 | 100,968 | +8,478 |
| 2011 |
Katainen
Jyrki Katainen
|
KOKSDPLEFTGREENSSPPKD | 257,494 | +20,428 | 92,490 | +8,808 |
| 2010 |
Kiviniemi
Mari Kiviniemi
|
KESKKOKGREENSSPP | 237,066 | +17,211 | 83,682 | +12,795 |
| 2009 |
Vanhanen II
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKKOKGREENSSPP | 219,855 | +16,414 | 70,887 | +10,717 |
| 2008 |
Vanhanen II
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKKOKGREENSSPP | 203,441 | +17,632 | 60,170 | −541 |
| 2007 |
Vanhanen II
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKKOKGREENSSPP | 185,809 | +16,001 | 60,711 | −2,432 |
| 2006 |
Vanhanen I
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKSDPSPP | 169,808 | +12,449 | 63,143 | −1,387 |
| 2005 |
Vanhanen I
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKSDPSPP | 157,359 | +11,135 | 64,530 | −3,375 |
| 2004 |
Vanhanen I
Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKSDPSPP | 146,224 | +8,185 | 67,905 | +388 |
| 2003 |
Jäätteenmäki / Vanhanen I
Anneli Jäätteenmäki / Matti Vanhanen
|
KESKSDPSPP | 138,039 | +7,613 | 67,517 | +3,986 |
| 2002 |
Lipponen II
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 130,426 | +7,622 | 63,531 | −2,684 |
| 2001 |
Lipponen II
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 122,804 | +9,559 | 66,215 | −2,450 |
| 2000 |
Lipponen II
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 113,245 | +5,850 | 68,665 | – |
| 1999 |
Lipponen II
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 107,395 | +7,077 | No debt data | – |
| 1998 |
Lipponen I
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 100,318 | +7,697 | No debt data | – |
| 1997 |
Lipponen I
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 92,621 | +7,501 | No debt data | – |
| 1996 |
Lipponen I
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 85,120 | +5,270 | No debt data | – |
| 1995 |
Lipponen I
Paavo Lipponen
|
SDPKOKLEFTGREENSSPP | 79,850 | +6,387 | No debt data | – |
| 1994 |
Aho
Esko Aho
|
KESKKOKKDSPP | 73,463 | +6,338 | No debt data | – |
| 1993 |
Aho
Esko Aho
|
KESKKOKKDSPP | 67,125 | +9,432 | No debt data | – |
| 1992 |
Aho
Esko Aho
|
KESKKOKKDSPP | 57,693 | +8,528 | No debt data | – |
| 1991 |
Aho
Esko Aho
|
KESKKOKKDSPP | 49,165 | +11,547 | No debt data | – |
Sources and notes
Parties, government years, migration and debt
1991–2025
Government participation is mapped at annual resolution. The migration side uses whole-country counts from Statistics Finland, and the debt side uses annual central government EDP debt. Early debt rows may be unavailable in the source table.
Selected measure: Persons with foreign background
Population 31 Dec by Year, Area and Information
https://pxdata.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__vaerak/statfin_vaerak_pxt_159t.px/
Updated: 2026-04-01
General government EDP deficit and debt, annually by Year, Sector and Information
https://pxdata.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__jali/statfin_jali_pxt_122g.px/
Updated: 2026-04-21
Curated yearly government coalition mapping for 1991–2025
Updated: 2026-05-01
Knowledge base
Discussion about immigration and multiculturalism is often based on vague impressions rather than concrete research, statistics, and case examples. This knowledge base collects material especially on immigration from major refugee-origin countries and Muslim-majority countries. The page gives particular emphasis to Islam because the topic is connected to several socially harmful developments. The aim is not to stigmatize individuals or groups, but to evaluate policies that increase immigration from such groups.
🇫🇷 France
mafrance.app is a French site documenting immigration-related incidents on an interactive map, conceptually similar to this site. It illustrates how much further the same development has progressed in France: thousands of incidents have been collected across the country, and their density shows the scale of the phenomenon. Finland is clearly behind France in this development, but the statistics and cases point in the same direction.
🇸🇪 Sweden
migrationskartan.se is a Swedish site mapping immigration-related incidents and statistics in Sweden. Sweden has taken in substantially more immigrants than Finland relative to population size, and the consequences — crime, segregation, and strain on the welfare system — are only at an earlier stage in Finland. The Swedish example acts as an early warning of where the same policies lead.
la.stnight.in is a site documenting immigration-related incidents in Sweden — conceptually similar to this site. Sweden has taken in substantially more immigrants than Finland relative to its population size, and the range of incidents gives a concrete picture of how the same development is progressing in our closest neighbour.
svuo.se is an interactive map of Sweden's socioeconomically disadvantaged areas. It visualises neighbourhoods and districts where immigration and segregation have substantially reshaped the population. The map illustrates where development in Sweden is heading and provides a comparison point for what Finland can expect.
demografie-europa.eu is a German-language demographic research portal providing interactive maps of population change, migration, and age structure across Europe at regional level. The maps visualise how immigration is reshaping the demographic composition of European countries and regions, giving a continent-wide perspective on the same trends visible in Finland.
🇬🇧 United Kingdom
The ONS interactive choropleth map from the 2021 census shows the share of people with Asian background by area. It clearly illustrates how certain urban areas — Leicester, Birmingham, and parts of London — have changed substantially. White British residents are already a minority in Leicester. The same development is only beginning in Finland.
The official ONS report on religious composition in England and Wales based on the 2021 census. Christianity fell below 50% for the first time (46.2%), while Muslims made up 6.5% of the population, up from 3.9% in 2011. The Muslim population grew by about 1.2 million in a decade.
The official ONS report on ethnic composition based on the 2021 census. White British residents fell from 87.2% in 2011 to 74.4% in 2021. Asian-background residents grew from 7.5% to 9.3% and black residents from 3.5% to 4.2%. London has long been majority non-white.
Migration Central (Centre for Migration Control) is a UK-based Substack publication tracking the impact of migration through statistics and individual cases — covering benefit claims, NHS registrations, arrests, and small-boat crossings. A significant share of the UK case material in this knowledge base is sourced from this site.
🇪🇸 Spain
datosinmigracion.es is a Spanish demographic platform visualising the foreign-born population across Spain as an interactive map. Data covers 1998–2025 and can be filtered by country of origin, province, gender, and age group. Spain is one of Europe's fastest-growing immigration countries — a dramatic rise in sexual violence (+332% over a decade) has been documented in official Eurostat statistics.
🇳🇱 Netherlands
Nederland in Beeld compiles official statistics on the societal impact of immigration in the Netherlands. The site presents daily-updated figures on prison populations, welfare use, crime suspects, housing allocation, and costs — sourced from CBS StatLine, IND, COA, and court databases. The Netherlands is one of Europe's best-documented examples of where mass immigration leads.
🇳🇴 Norway
Statistics Norway's (SSB) interactive map of the share of people with an immigrant background by municipality. The Oslo area stands out clearly — the map gives Nordic-scale context for where Finland is heading.
🇩🇰 Denmark
Statistics Denmark's official section on immigrants and their descendants. Covers population trends, countries of origin, and residential distribution. Denmark has tightened its immigration policy more sharply than most Nordic countries — the statistics show why.
Statistics Denmark's interactive map of the share of people with an immigrant background by municipality. Illustrates the geographic concentration and uneven distribution of demographic change across Denmark.
🇦🇹 Austria
Statistik Austria's official interactive atlas maps the distribution of the population by citizenship across Austria. Based on official population register data, it shows how the foreign-national population is concentrated in Vienna and other urban centres. Austria admitted a large number of asylum seekers relative to its size during the 2010s — the statistics provide a comparison point for Finland.
🇩🇪 Germany
messerinzidenz.de is a German site documenting knife attacks and blade crime across Germany on a case-by-case map. It collects incidents from news sources and visualises their geographic distribution. Knife crime in Germany has risen significantly alongside increased immigration.
Official interactive map from Germany's Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) showing the share of people with a migration background by district (Landkreis). Germany admitted over a million asylum seekers in 2015–2016 and has by far the largest immigrant population in the EU — the regional distribution shown here illustrates the long-term demographic consequences of large-scale migration.
demografie-europa.eu is a German-language demographic research portal providing interactive maps of population change, migration, and age structure across Europe at regional level. The maps visualise how immigration is reshaping the demographic composition of European countries and regions, giving a continent-wide perspective on the same trends visible in Finland.
Islam
United Kingdom
- 43% support introducing parts of sharia law, for example in civil and financial disputes, in Britain.
- 53% want to integrate fully with non-Muslims in every area of life.
- 71% feel that their local mosque represents their views.
- 53% want to send their children to schools with strong Muslim values.
- 44% support schools being able to require a hijab or niqab as part of the dress code.
- 52% would report to police if someone close to them were going to join circles supporting terrorism in Syria.
- 26% deny the existence of extremism in Muslim communities altogether.
- 26% consider the Israel-Palestine conflict the most important election issue, compared with 3% of the general population.
- 47% think Jews have too much power over British government policy, compared with 13% of the general population. The figure is 53% among men and higher among men aged 18-34.
- Only 25% believe Hamas committed murder and rape on 7 October 2023; among 18-34-year-olds, 53% believe Hamas did not.
- 46% sympathize more with Hamas than with Israel, compared with 27% of the general population and 53% among 18-34-year-olds.
- 25% believe Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish homeland, while 57% disagree.
- 63% want prayer rooms in public non-religious spaces, compared with 10% of the general population.
- 65% want Eid al-Fitr to be an official public holiday, compared with 21% of the general population.
- 57% want mandatory halal food in schools and hospitals.
- 52% want to ban showing images of the Prophet Muhammad, compared with 16% of the general population.
- Only 23% consider sharia law undesirable, compared with 60% of the general population.
- 35% consider legalizing polygamy undesirable, compared with 70% of the general population.
- 28% consider banning homosexuality undesirable, compared with 62% of the general population.
- Younger Muslims aged 18-34 and more educated Muslims are more radical on most questions.
France
- The French Interior Ministry's May 2025 report documents the activities of organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in France.
- It maps mosques, schools, associations, and political networks connected to the Brotherhood.
- Authorities regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a significant vector of Islamism in Europe, though it is not formally banned.
- The report is the French state's first systematic public mapping of Brotherhood-linked structures in the country.
- 44% would place religious rules ahead of French law in certain situations, up 16 percentage points since 1995.
- 46% support applying sharia in France either fully or partly.
- 38% accept all or some Islamist positions, up from 19% in 1998.
- 33% feel sympathy for at least one Islamist current: Muslim Brotherhood 24%, Salafism 9%, Wahhabism 8%, jihadism 3%.
- Among young people, 32% feel close to the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Among women aged 18-24, 45% wear the hijab, up from 16% in 2003.
Austria
- 18% said Islamic legal rules should replace Austrian law.
- 61% saw Islam primarily as a private matter.
- 25% wanted Islam to have a more visible role in society.
- 5% wanted Islam to dominate the legal system and the state.
- 24.7% hold negative or intolerant attitudes.
- 32.8% show some degree of discriminatory attitude toward other religions.
- 10% consider their own religion superior; among Somalis the figure is dramatically higher at 56.1%, compared with 11.1% among Sudanese and 7.5% among West Africans.
- 52.3% consider Quran teaching more important than ordinary schooling: 63.3% of men and 38.3% of women.
- 52.8% accept that a Muslim woman may choose her own spouse; men are clearly more reserved at 36.6%.
- About 50% of Muslim youth aged 14-25 showed antisemitic attitudes.
- 49.4% of pupils in Vienna's public middle schools (Mittelschule) are Muslim.
- 42% of all public school pupils are Muslim, up from 41.2% the previous year.
- Catholics 16.66% (down from 17.5%), Orthodox 14.18%, no religious affiliation 23.24%.
- Private schools: 7.6% Muslim; all schools combined: 38.3% Muslim.
Finland
The halal meat market is growing in Finland with immigration, affecting the food industry and consumer choices.
Abroad
A BKA study found that 45.1% of Muslims under 40 in Germany harbour latent or open sympathy for Islamism (Sharia over the constitution); 11.5% hold manifestly Islamist attitudes. Antisemitic attitudes among young Muslims rose sharply from 11.3% (2021) to 29.1% (2025).
Bild's coverage of the BKA Islamism study: roughly 45% of Muslims under 40 show latent or open Islamist attitudes, and antisemitism in the group rose dramatically.
Göttingen permitted the muezzin call for the first time during Ramadan on 19 February 2026, sparking a heated political debate. Far-right and conservative parties strongly opposed the decision while church leaders and a Jewish community representative defended it as religious freedom.
During Ramadan, 10–20% of Muslim youth in German schools pressure classmates not to eat or drink, acting as informal 'religious police'. 33% of school staff report religiously motivated conflicts; Muslim theologian Mouhanad Khorchide and Seyran Ateş warn of the political misuse of Ramadan.
Muslim immigration in Europe: research sources
This section collects academic books, peer-reviewed articles, and official reports that support and expand the rest of the knowledge base. The sources are not single news cases, but research and statistical material on demography, integration, labour markets, discrimination, crime, remittances, and smuggling networks.
Europe
- Pew estimated Europe's Muslim population at 25.8 million in 2016, or 4.9% of the population.
- Even with no further migration, the Muslim share would rise to 7.4% by 2050 because of age structure and fertility.
- In the medium scenario the share would be 11.2%, and in the high-migration scenario it would be 14.0% in 2050.
- Among migrants who arrived in Europe between 2010 and 2016, an estimated 53% were Muslim; among those granted or expected to be granted refugee status, 78% were Muslim.
- The median age of Muslims was 30.4 years versus 43.8 for non-Muslims; the total fertility rate was 2.6 children for Muslim women and 1.6 for non-Muslim women.
- Finland scenario 2050: ~190,000 Muslims (3.4% of population) in the medium scenario; over 250,000 in the high-migration scenario.
- The review finds a broad pattern of intergenerational assimilation in socioeconomic attainment, social relations, and cultural beliefs in Western societies.
- In Europe, religious difference, especially Islam's visibility and related symbolic boundaries, is a prominent factor complicating integration.
- The review distinguishes blending and segregating mechanisms across education, labour markets, social networks, cultural difference, and institutions.
- The source complements the critical material by showing where assimilation also proceeds.
- The book compares integration paths among Muslim minorities in Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Spain, and Greece.
- It emphasizes that socioeconomic, institutional, and political factors jointly shape integration.
- It also covers the institutionalization of Islam in Europe and state attempts to define or support 'moderate Islam'.
- The source gives background for why European country cases cannot be explained by a single variable.
- The book compares immigrant and second-generation integration in France, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and Canada.
- It examines labour markets, education, neighbourhoods, politics, religion, race, identity, and intermarriage.
- It emphasizes both progress and barriers created by institutions, social boundaries, and differences between origin groups.
- The source supports the comparison-site section because it studies the same Western receiving countries.
France
- The book studies Muslim immigrant integration in France and tries to isolate the religious component of discrimination.
- The authors describe a discriminatory equilibrium in which both Muslim-origin people and the native French react negatively toward one another and reinforce a vicious circle.
- The source is useful because it analyzes both majority discrimination and minority-side integration barriers.
- The book argues that religious and cultural difference can produce concrete labour-market and social consequences.
Netherlands
- The book examines Dutch multicultural policy and value conflict around Muslim immigrants.
- The authors argue that separate schools, housing, media, and community institutions strengthened group boundaries instead of weakening them.
- The book treats the problem not only as crime or terrorism, but as a conflict over values and fundamental loyalties.
- The source adds an academic Dutch case study to the multiculturalism section.
Labour markets and discrimination
- The study finds that Muslims in Western Europe are less likely to be employed than non-Muslims.
- Human capital, migration background, religiosity, cultural values, and perceived discrimination jointly explain about 40% of the Muslim/non-Muslim employment gap.
- The unexplained share suggests that symbolic boundaries around Islam may translate into tangible ethno-religious labour-market penalties.
- The results cover both first and second generations, though the mechanisms are not identical.
- The EU Fundamental Rights Agency report is based on Muslim experiences of discrimination, harassment, violence, and access to services.
- It examines how names, skin colour, and visible religious symbols such as a headscarf can trigger discriminatory treatment.
- The material covers labour markets, education, housing, public and private services, and awareness of support mechanisms.
- The source is an important counterweight because it documents discrimination against Muslim minorities and completes the integration picture.
- The report provides a broad comparison of immigrants and their children's labour markets, skills, living conditions, civic engagement, and social integration.
- It includes special chapters on elderly migrants, youth with foreign-born parents, and third-country nationals in European OECD countries.
- The report does not measure religion directly, but supports the economics and integration sections with comparable official data.
- The source helps separate differences between immigrant groups from general claims about all immigrants.
Crime and smuggling
- The study examines two large UK immigration waves: late-1990s/early-2000s asylum seekers and post-2004 EU accession migration.
- The first wave produced a modest but significant rise in property crime; the second wave had a small negative impact.
- Neither wave increased violent crime, and immigrant arrest rates were not different from native rates.
- The authors link crime effects especially to different labour-market opportunities between migrant groups.
- The study uses Italian provincial data from 1990-2003 and police administrative crime records.
- The size of the immigrant population correlates with property crimes and total crime, but causal analysis narrows the effect.
- Instrumental-variable estimates find that immigration increases only robberies and does not significantly affect the overall crime rate.
- The source is important because it separates correlation from causal effect in crime debates.
- Eurojust describes migrant smuggling as transnational organised crime that exploits migrants' vulnerability and can lead to violence, abuse, exploitation, and death.
- Digital tools were prominent in 2024 casework: smuggling networks used online platforms, social media, and encrypted phones for advertising, recruitment, and payments.
- Eurojust also observed a significant increase in violence by organised crime groups against migrants and authorities.
- The source adds an official EU authority perspective to the crime and cases section.
Remittances
- The World Bank estimated officially recorded remittances to low- and middle-income countries at USD 656 billion in 2023.
- In 2023, remittances exceeded foreign direct investment and official development assistance.
- The report notes that informal channels complicate statistics and that remittance data remain incomplete.
- The source supports the remittances section with official global scale.
- FATF describes hawala and similar providers as arranging transfer and receipt of funds through settlement methods outside the banking system.
- The report distinguishes legitimate traditional providers, hybrid providers, and criminally complicit providers.
- Risks include weak supervision, settlement across multiple jurisdictions, cash or trade-based value transfer, and commingling of licit and illicit funds.
- The source gives an authority basis for the hawala and remittances section.
Finland
- Finland's official population was 5,652,881 at the end of 2025.
- The population grew by 16,910 persons in 2025, almost half less than in the previous year.
- The number of second-generation persons with foreign background exceeded 100,000.
- Every fifth person living in Uusimaa was of foreign background.
- At the end of 2024, Finland had 610,148 foreign-language speakers, or 10.8% of the population.
- The number of foreign-language speakers increased by 51,854 during 2024.
- The number of people speaking Finnish, Swedish, or Sami as their native language fell by 19,734.
- The source provides official statistical support for the demographic-change section.
Persecution of Christians in Muslim countries
Source: Open Doors — list of countries where Christian persecution is most severe.
Top 10 countries
- 1. North Korea - communist and atheist oppression
- 2. Somalia - Islamic
- 3. Yemen - Islamic
- 4. Sudan - Islamic
- 5. Eritrea - Islamic
- 6. Syria - Islamic
- 7. Nigeria - Islamic
- 8. Pakistan - Islamic
- 9. Libya - Islamic
- 10. Iran - Islamic
FGM and honour-based violence
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a criminal offence in Finland. THL estimates approximately 10,000 women and girls living in Finland have undergone FGM. Honour-based violence primarily affects immigrant communities — Statistics Finland's 2021 survey found one in ten Finns had witnessed or experienced it.
Iltalehti article on honor violence: violence committed in the name of family or clan honor, especially in conservative immigrant communities.
THL arvioi, että noin 10 000 Suomessa asuvaa naista ja tyttöä on kokenut sukuelinten silpomisen. 650–3 080 Suomessa asuvaa tyttöä on arviolta vaarassa. MAAMU-tutkimus: 69 % somalitaustaisista naisista ja 32 % kurditaustaisista naisista raportoi kokeneensa silpomisen.
Noin 10 % 16–74-vuotiaista suomalaisista on havainnut tai kokenut kunniaan liittyvää väkivaltaa. Alle 35-vuotiaista yli joka kymmenes tuntee vähintään uhrin tai tekijän tai on itse kokenut sitä. Noin 1 % on ollut avioliitossa vastoin tahtoaan.
EU:n tasa-arvoinstituutin raportti FGM:n tilanteesta ja trendeistä Suomessa — sisältää riskiryhmien arviot, lainsäädännön ja ehkäisytoimet.
Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is often treated in public debate as inherently positive. Research evidence and case examples from around the world point to a more concrete problem: in highly multicultural societies, social trust tends to fall and safety weakens. Over time, multiculturalism can lead to dominance by the strongest group. Many Muslim-majority countries are especially clear examples, as members of other religious communities are often not treated as equal citizens and security problems are common.
Europe
- As immigration increases, social trust declines; both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis confirm the result.
- Economic recession and ethnic polarization further strengthen the negative effect.
- Published in Social Forces (Oxford University Press).
- Ethnic and religious diversity in the neighborhood lowers trust in neighbors.
- Negative or distant contact with people from different backgrounds makes the situation worse.
- Published in Social Science Research.
United States
- The more ethnically diverse a residential area is, the less people trust one another, including members of their own reference group.
- In diverse areas, people vote less, do less volunteer work, and participate less often in community activity.
- "Hunker down" effect: people withdraw into themselves and social isolation increases.
- The effect appears across all racial groups, not only the majority.
- Putnam is one of the best-known social scientists and the author of Bowling Alone. NYT article: https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/world/americas/05iht-diversity.1.6986248.html
- Putnam's paper included an optimistic hypothesis: in the long run, societies can forge new, more encompassing shared identities that overcome diversity's negative effects ('long-run amelioration'). This was a theoretical prediction, however, with no empirical support presented in the paper.
- Subsequent longitudinal research has not validated this optimism. Laurence & Bentley (2016), using an 18-year panel, found that sustained exposure to diversity reinforces withdrawal rather than reducing it. Replications of the Putnam effect across multiple countries have consistently confirmed the negative trust impact without the predicted recovery.
Australia
- In ethnically diverse areas, social cohesion and neighborhood interaction weaken, consistent with Putnam's "hunkering down" effect.
- The effect is stronger among the native population than among immigrants.
- Published in Journal of Urban Affairs.
United Kingdom
- Increasing diversity weakens residents' attitudes toward neighbors and the community, especially among those who stay in place.
- The longitudinal analysis allows a partly causal interpretation.
- Published in European Sociological Review.
International
- Genetic and cultural population diversity, especially migration history, correlates strongly with internal conflict, unrest, and distrust.
- The analysis covers both historical and present-day data.
- Published in Econometrica.
Economic effects
One of the most common arguments for immigration is its supposed benefit to the national economy. Immigration brings labour to a country where ageing and smaller working-age cohorts create demand. The statistics nevertheless show clearly that the economic contribution of many immigrant groups is not comparable with that of the native population and is often negative.
Finland
- VATT (Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus) tutkii parhaillaan maahanmuuton kokonaisvaikutuksia julkiseen talouteen.
- Tulokset odotetaan aikaisintaan vuonna 2027.
- Tutkimus kattaa suorat kustannukset (vastaanotto, integraatio, sosiaaliturva) sekä verotulojen ja työvoimavaikutukset.
- Aiempi VATT-arvio: noin –520 €/henkilö/vuosi, yhteensä ~107 milj. €/v — mutta tämä ei kata elinkaarivaikutuksia.
- Vahteran arvio maahanmuuton vuosittaisesta kokonaiskustannuksesta: noin 3,2 miljardia euroa.
- Laskelmassa huomioidaan sosiaaliturva, terveydenhuolto, koulutus ja hallintokustannukset suhteessa maahanmuuttajaryhmien maksamiin veroihin.
- Somalia: net fiscal cost excluding all services is EUR -7,900 per person; the total net effect is as much as EUR -13,850 per person.
- Iraq: similarly strongly negative.
- Immigrants from Western countries such as Germany and Sweden are close to zero or positive.
- Discounted lifecycle calculation: an immigrant from Somalia costs EUR -951,000 without children and up to EUR -1,343,000 with children.
- An immigrant from Iraq costs EUR -690,000 without children and EUR -844,000 with children.
- A broader analysis of immigration's economic effects, though without the same detailed country-of-origin data as the Suomen Perusta report.
Europe
- Immigration cost the Dutch public sector about EUR 400 billion net in 1995-2019, averaging about EUR 17 billion per year and peaking at EUR 32 billion in 2016.
- Immigrants use more social security, education, and other benefits than the native population and pay less in taxes and social-security contributions.
- The net effect is negative for every immigration category: work, study, asylum, and family. Asylum seekers and family migrants are the most expensive.
- The results were calculated using generational accounting: all income and expenditure from immigration to death or return migration.
The Helsingin Sanomat editorial and article ask whether immigration endangers the long-term sustainability of the pension system. Lower employment among immigrants and a higher probability of receiving benefits weaken the system's funding base.
Helsingin Sanomat editorial: immigrants' lower employment rate and higher benefit use weaken the long-term funding base of the pension system.
Helsingin Sanomat article: the pension-contribution accumulation of immigrant groups is clearly lower than that of the native population, weakening the system's net balance.
Finland
Yle article on the economic effects of immigration in Finland.
Abroad
Refers to research on the economic effects of immigration, with Finland presented as a warning example of mass immigration's problems. Finland is described as a clear European case showing that immigration does not economically compensate for population ageing.
54% of Arabic speakers receive basic social assistance — Kela's last-resort benefit. Among Finnish or Swedish speakers the rate is only 3.7%. Foreign-language speakers make up roughly 9–10% of the population but account for around 30% of all social assistance recipients.
Yle discusses immigration's effect on public finances; the net effect of immigrant groups on the public sector is often negative, especially for humanitarian migrants.
Hamburg spent €600 million on hotel accommodation for asylum seekers, illustrating the enormous municipal-level costs of mass migration.
Berliinin kaupungin maahanmuuttajien majoituskulut ovat nousseet lähes 900 miljoonaan euroon – esimerkki maahanmuuton massiivisista kustannuksista myös suurkaupungeissa.
Berlin spent over €2.235 billion on refugee accommodation, food, and integration in 2025 — a figure that nearly doubled between 2022 and 2025 — while federal cost-sharing is declining.
In 2025 approximately 65.4% of adult first-time asylum applicants arrived in Germany without any ID documents — a record high according to the Federal Interior Ministry.
Education and integration
The PISA 2022 study reveals a substantial learning gap between immigrant-background and native pupils. The gap appears to be narrowing in the statistics — but not because immigrant pupils are improving; native pupils' results have been declining.
Ensimmäisen polven maahanmuuttajat jäävät Suomessa noin 105 pistettä kantaväestöä jälkeen PIAAC-lukutaitomittarissa — suurin kuilu kaikista PIAAC-osallistujamaista. Kuilu kapenee noin 51 pisteeseen, kun maahanmuuttaja puhuu suomea tai ruotsia kotona ja on asunut Suomessa vähintään 5 vuotta. 83 % TE-palveluiden asiantuntijoista sanoo huonon lukutaidon johtaneen työnhakijan hylkäämiseen.
Remittances abroad
A significant share of humanitarian immigration also includes economic mechanisms. Remittances are a widely known system through which immigrants send money back to their countries of origin. Some of this money is also known to flow into terrorist and criminal use. The apparent humanitarian benefit of immigration is small compared with the costs imposed on the receiving society, while the arriving population group is small in global terms.
Unofficial transfers remain hidden.
Hawala is a cash-based transfer system classified by Swedish authorities as a high-risk money-laundering channel, level 4 of 4. Transfers use broker codes, making tracing nearly impossible.
The Swedish financial supervisor's risk assessment of the hawala system classifies it as a high-risk money-laundering channel.
Welfare use by background
Official Statistics Finland and Kela data show a substantial gap between native Finns and people of foreign background in welfare use. Arabic-speaking groups receive basic social assistance at a rate roughly 15 times that of Finnish or Swedish speakers.
Ulkomaalaistaustaisen väestön (20–64 v.) työttömyysaste oli 16,7 % vuonna 2024, kun suomalaistaustaisilla se oli 6,6 %. Ero on 2,5-kertainen. Korkeimmillaan ulkomaalaistaustaisten työttömyys oli pandemia-ajan jälkeen 2022, jolloin luku laski hetkellisesti 11,5 %:iin.
54% of Arabic speakers receive basic social assistance — Kela's last-resort benefit. Among Finnish or Swedish speakers the rate is only 3.7%. Foreign-language speakers make up roughly 9–10% of the population but account for around 30% of all social assistance recipients.
Kela havaitsi viime vuonna yli 1 000 etuusväärinkäytösepäilyä, yhteisarvoltaan noin 7 miljoonaa euroa. Poliisille tehtiin 471 tutkintapyyntöä. Ruotsissa Försäkringskassan esti vääriä maksuja 877,5 miljoonan euron edestä vuonna 2024; Suomessa peritään takaisin noin 110 miljoonaa euroa virheellisiä maksuja. Ministeri Grahn-Laasonen: 'mikä on mahdollista Ruotsissa, on mahdollista Suomessa' — järjestäytynyt rikollisuus käyttää sosiaaliturvaa hyväksi systemaattisesti.
Criminality
This section collects examples and statistics on crime and public-safety problems connected with immigration in Europe. The examples are not meant to describe every individual in any group, but to document patterns, risks, and policy consequences that are often minimized in public debate.
Eurostat statistics show a substantial increase in reported sexual offences in several European countries. Reported rape rose sharply in Spain over the last decade, and the EU-wide increase was about 150%.
Eurostat's statistical overview shows reported sexual violence offences increasing significantly in the EU during 2014–2024.
Eurostat reports that rape reports increased by an EU average of 150%, and by 322% in Spain, over the last decade.
Remix News summarizes Eurostat reporting that sexual offences multiplied in several Western European countries, a trend linked here to immigration.
Tanskaan vuonna 1992 erityislailla otetusta 321 libanonilaisesta palestiinalaisesta 204 (64 %) sai rikostuomion vuoteen 2019 mennessä; 71 vankilatuomion. Heidän 999 lapsestaan 337 (34 %) on tuomittu rikoksesta. 176 ensimmäisen sukupolven jäsentä elää tukien varassa, 122 varhaiseläkkeellä. Kaikki Tanskan suuret puolueet pitävät vastaanottoa epäonnistuneena. Entinen oikeusministeri Hans Engell: ryhmää 'ei olisi pitänyt päästää sisään'. Pia Kjærsgaard: 'valtava virhe'.
Virallinen parlamentaarinen vastaus Tanskan maahanmuutto- ja integraatiovaliokunnalle: 321:stä libanonilaisesta palestiinalaisesta 204 (64 %) tuomittu rikoksesta 1992–2019, 71 vankilaan. Heidän 999 lapsestaan 337 (34 %) tuomittu. 176 ensimmäisen sukupolven henkilöä tukien varassa, 122 varhaiseläkkeellä.
Artikkeli referoi parlamenttidataa: 64 % ensimmäisestä sukupolvesta rikostuomittuja, 34 % toisesta. Kaikki suuret tanskalaiset puolueet pitävät palestiinalaisvastaanottoa epäonnistuneena. Entinen oikeusministeri Engell myönsi ryhmää 'ei olisi pitänyt päästää sisään'; Pia Kjærsgaard kutsui sitä 'valtavaksi virheeksi'.
Sweden Against Organized Crime -raportti (toukokuu 2026, yhteistyössä Ruotsin poliisin ja Acta Publican kanssa): järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden ydinjoukkoon kuuluu 50 165 henkilöä, laajennettu verkosto 224 390. Heistä 60 %:lla vähintään yksi ulkomailla syntynyt vanhempi, 49 %:lla molemmat, 30 % itse ulkomailla syntyneitä – vaikka ensimmäisen ja toisen sukupolven maahanmuuttajat muodostavat vain ~27 % Ruotsin väestöstä. Ydinjoukolle maksettiin tukia ja etuuksia ~27 mrd. kruunua (n. 2,5 mrd. €) 2015–2024. Järjestäytynyt rikollisuus kytkeytyy ~40 %:iin kaikista rekisteröidyistä rikosepäilyistä (1995–2023).
Remix News referoi raporttia: 60 % järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden ydinjoukoista maahanmuuttajataustaisia, 49 %:lla molemmat vanhemmat ulkomailla syntyneitä. Ydinjoukon koko 50 165, laajennettu verkosto 224 390. Järjestäytynyt rikollisuus kytkeytyy ~40 %:iin kaikista rikosepäilyistä 1995–2023.
Alkuperäinen ruotsinkielinen viranomaisraportti: järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden laajuus, väestörakenne, talousrikollisuus ja yhteydet julkisiin varoihin Ruotsissa 2015–2024.
Finland
People with foreign background accounted for 32% of sexual offences nationwide and about 40% in Helsinki. In 2024, 9,608 sexual offences were recorded.
In 2018, 297,600 crime suspects were identified, of whom 34,200 were foreign nationals. Age- and gender-standardised suspicion index: foreign nationals were suspected 1.2x more often than Finnish nationals. Iraqi men were suspected of sexual offences 12.8x more often than Finnish men (2017–2018 combined). Somali men were suspected of drug offences 3.4x more often; Swedish women of property crimes 3.1x more often. Iraqis overall 2.0x, Swedes 2.3x. Figures represent suspicions, not convictions.
Abroad
A broad list of vehicle-related migrant incidents in Europe.
UK net migration peaked at 745,000 in 2022. White British residents in London fell from 60% in 2001 to 37% in 2021. After Brexit, only 47,000 of 1.3 million visas went to EU citizens.
Case tracker for immigration-related crime in Germany.
BKA PKS 2025 suspect tables by nationality. Normalised to per 100,000 of each nationality (BKA + Destatis; nationalities with fewer than 5 cases excluded; analysis by @TheRealTom): Lebanon 97.5 – Algeria 89.6 – Tunisia 59.4 – Stateless 58.7 – Gambia 45.2 – Guinea 33.5 – Somalia 32.8 – Morocco 26.9 – Georgia 24.8 – Afghanistan 24.2 – Sweden 24.0 – Albania 21.9 – Moldova 21.3 – Syria 20.2 – Bosnia-Herzegovina 18.9 – Eritrea 18.6 – Colombia 18.3 – Iraq 17.4 – Lithuania 16.7 – Czech Republic 14.2 – Turkey 12.9 – Iran 11.8 – Vietnam 11.7 – Netherlands 11.3 – Romania 11.2 – Germany 2.2. Figures are suspects, not convictions.
SVT:n analyysi kaikista oikeustuomioista viideltä vuodelta: 58 % raiskauksesta tai sen yrityksestä tuomituista syntynyt ulkomailla. 843 tuomitusta 197 oli Lähi-idästä tai Pohjois-Afrikasta, 45 Afganistanista. Tuntemattoman tekijän tapauksissa ulkomaalaistaustaisten osuus yli 80 %.
Ardavan Khoshnoodin (dosentti, Lund) tutkimus: 63 % Ruotsin raiskaustuomituista on maahanmuuttajataustaisia. Ulkomailla syntyneet, jotka saapuivat Ruotsiin yli 15-vuotiaina, ovat kantaväestöä merkittävästi yliedustettuna tuomioissa. Tuomioiden todennäköisyys on käänteisesti yhteydessä asumisaikaan – lyhyempi asumisaika korreloi korkeampaan tuomioasteeseen. Myös sosioekonominen asema otettiin huomioon muuttujana.
The Telegraphin uutinen Ruotsin raiskaustuomiotilastoista: lähes kaksi kolmasosaa tuomituista on maahanmuuttajia – viittaa samaan Lundin yliopiston tutkimukseen kuin tietopankissa jo aiemmin viitattu.
Berliinin viralliset rikostilastot: seksuaalirikokset kasvoivat dramaattisesti ja lähes 40 % raiskaajista on ei-saksalaisia – maahanmuuttajien yliedustus selkeä.
Espanjalainen Gaceta raportoi Ruotsin raiskaustuomiotilastoista: lähes kaksi kolmasosaa tuomituista on ensimmäisen tai toisen sukupolven maahanmuuttajia.
Uudet saksalaiset tilastot osoittavat joukkoraiskaajien määrän olevan ennätystasolla – maahanmuuttajat merkittävästi yliedustettuna tekijöissä.
Tanskan viralliset rikostilastot: ei-länsimaalaiset maahanmuuttajat tekevät kolmanneksen raiskauksista ja väkivaltarikoksista väestöosuuteensa nähden selvästi yliedustettuina.
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern there are 1,497 open arrest warrants; 1,134 (75%) concern foreign nationals. For violent crimes, foreigners account for roughly 90% of wanted suspects (74 of 83). Top nationalities sought: Poles (364), Georgians (107), Romanians (75), Ukrainians (68), Tunisians (58). Foreign suspects can more easily evade justice by fleeing to their home countries or into parallel communities.
German journalist Julia Ruhs hosts ARD's investigative magazine 'Klar – Was Deutschland bewegt'. After NDR removed her from the anchor role following controversial reporting on migration and Islamism, she returned to the programme with backing from Bavarian Broadcasting (BR). FAZ praises her confident comeback and willingness to cover sensitive topics.
43.1% of violent-crime suspects in Germany in 2024 were foreign nationals, and roughly 40% of all suspects lacked German citizenship. Welt documents the gap between media portrayal (where foreign suspects appear in up to 94.6% of TV crime reports) and the actual statistical share.
Ecoplan-raportin mukaan noin 60 % Algeriasta, Marokosta ja Tunisiasta saapuneista turvapaikanhakijoista syyllistyy rikoksiin Sveitsissä – vaikka hyväksyntäaste on vain 0,3–2,5 %. Ajoneuvovarkaudet kolminkertaistuivat joillakin kantoneissa. Sveitsin siirtolaisvirasto ottaa käyttöön koordinoituja lainvalvontatoimia.
Cases
Finland
Hadi al-Sharkat, 26, tuomittiin Helsingin hovioikeudessa 4,5 vuodeksi törkeästä lapsen raiskauksesta. Rikos tapahtui elokuussa 2022 Länsi-Uudellamaalla: äiti oli kutsunut tuttavansa kotiin, ja mies hyökkäsi 13-vuotiaan tytön kimppuun äidin ollessa parvekkeella. Käräjäoikeus tuomitsi 2 vuotta 6 kuukautta, hovioikeus korotti tuomion merkittävästi. Al-Sharkat kiisti teot, mutta molemmat oikeudet pitivät uhrin kertomusta uskottavampana. Korvaukset: 7 000 € kärsimyksistä, 2 000 € tilapäisestä haitasta.
Abroad
Students in Amsterdam reported a climate of fear in a residence shared with asylum seekers; reports of sexual violence did not lead the city to end the project.
A 22-year-old asylum seeker was arrested for the murder of 17-year-old Lisa in Amsterdam and was also linked to an earlier rape and sexual assault.
Somali-born Essa Suleiman was charged with attempted murder over the Golders Green attack in London in spring 2026.
A German woman received a harsher sentence than a migrant for a similar offence, raising questions about equal treatment and double standards in criminal sentencing.
Shah Rahman, part of an al-Qaeda-inspired cell that plotted attacks on the London Stock Exchange, the US Embassy, and Boris Johnson, was released on parole against the Justice Secretary's objections. He received a 12-year sentence, was first freed in 2017, and was recalled in 2022 for breaching conditions.
Klevis Disha, 39, entered the UK illegally in 2001 under a false identity. Jailed in 2017 for £250,000 in crime proceeds. A tribunal ruled deportation 'unduly harsh' partly because his son's sensory issues mean he will not eat non-British chicken nuggets.
A judge blocked deportation of a migrant on the grounds that removal would cause him stress.
Shahid Butt won a Birmingham council election despite facing criticism over his statements on Yemen.
A Pakistani man convicted of assaulting a teenage girl won an appeal against deportation, arguing he could not access addiction treatment in Pakistan where alcohol is banned for Muslims. A judge ruled removal would constitute inhuman treatment. The Home Office appealed.
A migrant convicted of a paedophile offence avoided deportation from Britain by citing his UK wife.
A Cameroonian migrant was granted asylum in Britain after claiming to be gay, despite having a secret wife and child in Cameroon.
A 21-year-old Syrian man raped a 13-year-old girl in Tromsø in September 2024 and received just six months. The court cited his low IQ (estimated 41–75) and developmental level comparable to the victim as mitigating factors. Norway had removed the three-year minimum sentence for child rape.
Afsar Safi, 30, arrived by small boat in 2021 and sexually assaulted a seven-year-old girl at a government-funded hotel in West London. His asylum claim revealed Taliban links; it was rejected. He was sentenced to just two and a half years and could be released on licence within six months. He must register as a sex offender for seven years.
Ulkomaan kansalaiset tuomittiin 25 %:ssa naisten seksuaalirikoksista Britanniassa.
Lontoon data: noin 40 % seksuaalihyökkäyksistä syytetyistä on ulkomaankansalaisia.
Brittiviranomaisten virallinen raportti ryhmämuotoisesta lasten seksuaalisesta hyväksikäytöstä – turvapaikanhakijat mukana.
Kanaalin ylitysreitiltä tulleiden ulkomaankansalaisten seksuaalirikostuomiot kasvoivat merkittävästi vuosina 2021–2024.
Rapualla Ahmadze raiskasi haavoittuvan nuoren puistossa Elginissä, Skotlannissa.
Zayed Alanzi tuomittiin vankilaan, kun hän pakolla suuteli kriisitilanteessa ollutta naista hotellissa Hullissa.
Kolme miestä, joukossa iranilaisia ja egyptiläisiä, syytetty naisen raiskauksesta Brightonin rannalla.
Moustafa Elbohy uhkasi kääntäjäsovelluksen kautta raiskauksella naista Charing Crossin aseman lähistöllä Lontoossa.
Kamran Khan tuomittiin seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä nuoreen tyttöön Lambethissa, Lontoossa.
Abdelrahmen Adnan Abouelela tuomittiin kahdeksaksi vuodeksi raiskauksesta Hyde Parkissa.
Taha Derwish pidätettiin seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä Crewen turvapaikkahotellin ulkopuolella Cheshiressä.
Tadi Alemeyeha Didsburystä, Manchesterista, syytetty seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä.
Haybe Cabdiraxmaan Nur, somalialainen mies, tuomittiin elinkautiseen puukotusmurhasta Derbyyssä.
Sheraz Malik syytetty raiskauksesta Sutton-in-Ashfieldissä.
Deng Chol Majek syytetty puukotusmurhasta Walsallissa.
Hadush Kebatu tuomittiin seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä sekä naiseen että 14-vuotiaaseen tyttöön Eppingissä, Essexissä.
Qais Al-Aswad sai lyhennetyn tuomion seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä Horleyssa, Surreyssa.
Fawaz Alsamaou sai kolmen vuoden tuomion seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä Cardiffissa, Walesissa.
Hakan Barac tuomittiin islamilaisen ääriajattelun vuoksi ISIS:n tukemisesta Newportissa, Monmouthshiressa.
Safi Dawood pidätettiin epäiltynä puukotusmurhasta Hillingdonissa, Lontoossa.
Ibrahim Zouari ja Houssine Nouira jahtasivat hotellihenkilökuntaa veitsellä Bournemouthissa, Dorsetissa.
Mohammed Abdullah, syyrialainen turvapaikanhakija, raiskasi naisen Bournemouthin rannalla.
Shkar Jamal sai yhteisömääräyksen käytöksestä turvapaikkahotellissa Bournemouthissa.
Sukirthan Thangrasha syytetty hyökkäyksestä ja häiritsevästä paljastumisesta saavuttuaan laittomasti UK:hon Southamptonissa.
Rabie Knissi tuomittiin raiskauksenyrityksen perusteella Portsmouthissa.
Shafiullah Rasooli hyökkäsi seksuaalisesti naiseen takeaway-ravintolassa Maidstoneissa.
The Sunin kampanja tunnisti Amin Abedi Mofrad -pedofiilirikoksentekijän, joka raiskasi lapsen Oxfordissa.
Abdul Hamed tuomittiin kotiinmurtautumiseen liittyvän raiskauksen perusteella Swindonissa.
Abdulmawal Ibrahim Adam, sudanilainen maahanmuuttaja, syytetty tytön sieppauksen yrityksestä Swindonissa.
Ahmad Mulakhi ja Mohammad Kabir syytetty tyttöihin kohdistuneista raiskauksista Nuneatonissa.
Mohammed Wahid Mohammed raiskasi 12-vuotiaan tarjoamalla karkkeja Birminghamissa – tuomioistuin harkitsee karkottamista.
Shalw Jamel tuomittiin kannabiksen salakuljetuksesta Swanseassa, Walesissa.
Fayaz Khan, maahanmuuttaja, tuomittiin vankilaan uhkauksista Nigel Faraqen tappamisesta Southwarkissa.
Mohammed Sharwarq tuomittiin vankilaan neljän ihmisen pahoinpitelystä hotellissa Eppingissä, jossa hän itse asui turvapaikanhakijana.
Mostafa Sepahvand, Farhad Javadi Manesh ja Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori syytetty kansallisen turvallisuuden lain rikkomisesta terrorismiepäilyjen perusteella Westminsterissä.
Karwan Muhammad ja Ahmad Arshad löydettiin 7 kg:n huumekuorman kanssa Cardiffissa, Walesissa.
Ahmadreza Khalafi syytetty raiskauksesta Bishop's Stortfordissa.
Eid Anwar Fathi Najjar myönsi raiskauksen ja seksuaalisen hyökkäyksen Yorkissa – odottaa vankilatuomiota.
Sadeq Nikzad tuomittiin vankilaan seurattuaan 15-vuotiasta tyttöä ja raiskattuaan tämän Falkirkin kaupunkikeskuksessa, Skotlannissa.
Al-Najjar Amir Abdulrahim, gazalainen turvapaikanhakija, yritti tavata alaikäisen tytön seksiä varten Stockton-on-Teesissa.
Moussa Ibrahim syytetty häiritsevästä paljastumisesta Middlesbroughssa.
Edris Abdelrazig syytetty lapsen sieppauksen yrityksestä Stockportissa.
Albanialaiset maahanmuuttajat piilottautuivat suureen kannabistilaan Attleboroughissa, Norfolkissa – tuomittiin vankilaan.
Tuomittu pedofiili pidätettiin Brittania Ashley Hotelissa Hale'ssa, jota käytetään turvapaikanhakijien majoittamiseen.
Iranilainen turvapaikanhakija, joka asui veronmaksajien rahoittamassa talossa, tutki pommi-iskua Israelin suurlähetystöön Rochdalessa.
Turvapaikanhakija yritti polttaa asuntonsa Leedsissä, koska ei saanut haluamaansa apua viranomaistaholta.
Mies syytetty häiritsevästä paljastumisesta ja seksuaalisista teoista turvapaikkahotellin ikkunalla Falkirkissä, Skotlannissa.
Omistaja löysi turvapaikanhakijan valmistamassa ruokaa hänen kesämökissään St Ivesissa, Cornwallissa.
Maahanmuuttaja, joka asui Canary Wharfin hotellissa, pidätettiin käveltyään sokeaan naisen asuntoon Tower Hamletssissa, Lontoossa.
24-vuotias libyalainen, joka saapui pienellä veneellä, pidätettiin puukotushyökkäyksestä Eastbournessa, jossa kolme ihmistä loukkaantui.
Turvapaikanhakija tuomittiin vankilaan harvinaisten kasvien vahingoittamisesta ja varastamisesta Oxfordissa.
Turvapaikanhakija tuomittiin vankilaan lapsiin kohdistuneista verkossa tapahtuneista seksuaalirikoksista Norwichissä.
Turvapaikanhakija tuomittiin vankilaan naisen raiskauksesta Norwichin kaupunkikeskuksessa.
Ahmed Muhammad Almahi syytetty seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä naiseen Rugbyssä, Warwickshiressa.
Irakilainen turvapaikanhakija vaarassa menettää oleskelulupansa ja joutua karkotetuksi osallistuttuaan Hanleyn katumellakoihin Stoke-on-Trentissä.
Ruotsalainen tuomioistuin kieltäytyi karkottamasta raiskauksesta tuomittua maahanmuuttajaa – tapaus herätti laajaa raivoa, pääministeri lupasi tiukennuksia lainsäädäntöön.
Ruotsalainen tapaus, jossa useita miehiä tuomittiin järjestäytyneestä seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä Skellefteåssa – kansainvälisesti laajasti raportoitu esimerkki joukkoraiskauksesta.
Kaksi afganistanilaista turvapaikanhakijaa tuomittiin Britanniassa teinitytön sieppauksesta ja raiskauksesta.
Ruotsalainen tapaus: maahanmuuttajataustainen mies syytetään tytön raiskaamisesta neljässä eri julkisessa käymälässä – Expressenin uutinen.
Syyrialainen, jonka turvapaikkahakemus oli hylätty, pidätettiin puukkoiskun jälkeen Saksassa – tapaus nostatti keskustelun siitä, miksi hylätyt turvapaikanhakijat yhä oleskelevat maassa.
Oikeudenkäynti Rochdalessa ja Manchesterissa: tyttöjä pidettiin seksuaalisina orjina vuosikausia – uusi oikeudenkäynti tuo esille laajemman verkoston laajuuden.
Kaksi nuorta afganistanilaista turvapaikanhakijaa tuomittiin raiskauksesta Britanniassa.
Kolme turvapaikanhakijaa tuomittiin syyllisiksi naisen julman raiskauksen yhteydessä rannalla Etelä-Englannissa.
Ruotsalainen tuomioistuin kieltäytyi karkottamasta 16-vuotiaan raiskauksen tekijää vedoten rikoksen 'kestoon' – tapaus herätti kansainvälistä huomiota.
Amsterdamilainen nainen, jota yritettiin raiskata, pettyi oikeuden tuomioon – kertoo kuristamisesta pitkään ja kovasti. Tekijä maahanmuuttajataustainen.
Bild: police search for a wanted criminal in Baden-Württemberg.
A Turkish gang was remanded in custody after a shooting in Giessen city centre, Germany.
Police in Bremen are hunting two Turkish suspects after a series of targeted leg-shooting incidents in March 2026.
ZDF reports on the alleged sexual assault of a 16-year-old at a Berlin-Neukölln youth centre. Authorities are accused of delaying reporting of the incident to avoid damaging the reputation of the Muslim-led centre.
A passenger was stabbed in the back of the neck on Berlin public transport. BZ Berlin reports on the attack, which highlights ongoing violence on the city's transit network.
An Afghan man is accused of sexually abusing an 11-year-old girl in a school toilet in Germany.
The Bielefeld attacker is suspected of having killed two men in Syria before coming to Germany.
A 17-year-old Syrian was arrested on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack in Hamburg, Germany.
Germany spends €1 billion a year on integration courses, yet only about one in three participants completes them.
A Swedish investigation found that over 300 local politicians have ties to gang crime, a phenomenon linked to broader immigration-related gang culture.
Trial after a knife attack in Dresden in which an American tourist was injured. The perpetrator was convicted and offered only a mumbled apology to the victim.
Junge Freiheit investigates whether the young killer from Memmingen was Islamist-motivated, raising questions about the radicalisation of foreign-background criminals.
A 23-year-old Syrian man attempted to rape a 15-year-old girl in the toilet of an ICE high-speed train in Germany.
16-year-old Liana was pushed in front of a train at a German railway station. The Iraqi perpetrator was sentenced to psychiatric detention.
German authorities carried out a counter-terrorism raid in Bremerhaven after the New York Police Department passed on a tip about a potential terror threat.
A 22-year-old Syrian asylum seeker admitted in a Berlin court to planning terrorist attacks targeting Germans and Jews. He radicalised through Islamic State content on TikTok within roughly 15 months of arriving in Germany in 2023, and was constructing a suicide vest when arrested in November 2025. Sentencing was set for 5 June 2026.
A Syrian man living in Germany faces charges of crimes against humanity: he is alleged to have tortured 70 prisoners to death during the Syrian civil war before coming to Germany.
Trial in Ansbach: an asylum seeker is accused of travelling back from Germany to Iraq to commit a murder and then returning to Germany.
A 35-year-old Islamic religious teacher in Baden-Württemberg was convicted by Ellwangen regional court of sexually abusing eight boys aged 12–17 in 27 separate incidents. He was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison and banned from working with male minors for five years.
A 19-year-old Afghan man attacked a 41-year-old woman with a knife at the Frankfurt Main riverbank on 10 June 2024, stabbing her multiple times in the head and neck while she sat on a park bench. He was arrested and charged with attempted murder and dangerous bodily harm.
Berlin's Kammergericht convicted four Hamas members to sentences of 4.5–6 years for maintaining weapons depots in Poland, Bulgaria, and Denmark intended for terrorist attacks. They were arrested in December 2023; the trial began in February 2025.
Bild reports on a case in North Rhine-Westphalia where children wrote a letter to their murdered mother, signing off with the Muslim prayer 'May God have mercy on you'. The case highlights domestic violence in migrant communities.
A 25-year-old Afghan man stabbed a 46-year-old passenger in the neck with a folding knife on a Dortmund city tram on 11 February 2026, after the victim asked him to lower his voice during a phone call. The attacker fled at the next stop; the victim's injuries were not life-threatening.
Germany deported 20 criminal Afghan migrants from Leipzig/Halle airport, including the convicted perpetrator from the high-profile Illerkirchberg rape case. The flight cost €335,000 and was one of the first large-scale deportation operations under the new federal government's stricter migration policy.
36-vuotias syyrialainen pyysi ensin 33-vuotiaalta tupakkaa bussipysäkillä Neuköllnissä, sitten puukotti tätä niskaan. Muutamia tunteja myöhemmin sama epäilty uhkasi veitsellä 32-vuotiasta naista toisella pysäkillä vaatien rahaa. Uhri oli kriittisessä mutta ei hengenvaarallisessa tilassa.
Bangladeshilainen maahanmuuttaja syytetään 17-vuotiaan bangladeshilaisen naisen – vastasyntyneen lapsen äidin – raiskauksesta Venetsiassa. Uhri pakeni ja ilmoitti asiasta puolisolleen, joka otti yhteyttä poliisiin. Tapaus herätti oikeistopoliitikoilta kommentteja maahanmuuttajayhteisöistä ja naisten asemasta.
35-vuotias marokkolainen mies pidätettiin Lleidassa, kun asukas löysi 40-vuotiaan naisen tiedottomana kadulta miehen hänen päällään ja housut alas vedettynä. Nainen oli vahvasti päihtynyt; poliisi tutki, pystyikö hän antamaan suostumuksensa.
52-vuotias irakilainen pidätettiin eurooppalaisella pidätysmääräyksellä: pakotti tyttärensä pakkoavioliittoon kurdikansalaisten miesten kanssa, eristi ja pahoinpiteli häntä. Uhri tarvitsi 15 vrk:n parantumisajan; pakeni poliisin avustuksella.
22-vuotias malilainen seurasi 70-vuotiasta naista rappukäytävään ja hyökkäsi hänen kimppuunsa veitsellä Pistoiassa kesäkuussa 2025. Firenzen hovioikeus kumosi pidätysmääräyksen huhtikuussa 2026 – asiakirjoja ei ollut käännetty syytetyn äidinkielelle. Uhrin perhe pelkäsi turvallisuutensa puolesta, sillä miehellä ei ole vakituista asuntoa eikä sähköistä valvontaa.
45-vuotias marokkolainen mies hyökkäsi kirveellä kolmeen asukkaaseen Granadan läänin Montefrío'ssa: kaksi iäkästä naista joutuivat kriittisessä tilassa sairaalaan kallovammojen vuoksi. Hyökkääjä huusi 'Allahin kutsu ja kaikkien kristittyjen on kuoltava'. Myös iäkäs mies ja toinen nainen loukkaantuivat ennen pidätystä.
37-vuotias marokkolainen pidätettiin Mantovan maakunnassa pahoinpideltyään 30-vuotiasta marokkolaisvaimoaan metalliputkella; yhdeksänvuotias poika todisti hyökkäyksen ja soitti apua. Uhri tarvitsi 10 vrk:n hoitoajan.
Neljän egyptiläisen miehen ryöstöjengi hajotettiin Torinossa: jengi käytti veistä ja pippurisumutetta ryöstäessään kulkijoilta kultakoruja. Tekijät kuvasivat ryöstöjään ja julkaisivat sisällön TikTokissa.
Muhammed (24, syyrialainen) ja Khan (23, afgaanilainen) syytettyinä Sør-Rogalandin käräjäoikeudessa heinäkuussa 2025 tapahtuneesta ryöstöraiskauksesta: seurasivat uhria systemaattisesti kaupunginkeskuksesta, pakottivat hänet autoon ja ajoi koulun taakse jossa molemmat raiskaavat. Aluksi kiistivät, tunnustivat lopulta oikeudessa.
17-vuotias syyrialainen pidätettiin 12.3.2026 epäiltynä 19-vuotiaan naisen murhasta lähellä Mannheimin Gartenstadt-kaupunginosaa. 60 poliisin erikoisryhmä pidätti hänet samana iltana; tutkintavankeus määrättiin.
22-vuotias afgaanilainen hyökkäsi keittiöveitsellä linja-autoon ja poliiseihin Bergen auf Rügenissä 5.6.2024 sekä vandalisoi EU-vaaliplakaatteja. Syytteet omaisuusvahingosta, hyökkäyksestä poliisia kohtaan ja rikoksista.
Haastattelussa ukrainalaispakolaisäiti, jonka tytär Liana (16) työnnettiin junan eteen kesällä 2025 irakkilaisen miehen toimesta. Tekijä vapautettiin rikosoikeudellisesta vastuusta ja määrättiin valtion kustantamaan psykiatriseen hoitoon; äiti ilmaisee täydellisen pettymyksensä, sillä uhrin perheen oikeuskulut kaatuvat heidän omille harteilleen.
Turkin syyttäjät myyvät sosiaalisessa mediassa valheellisia rikossyyteasiakirjoja, jotka kirjataan Turkin oikeusjärjestelmän tietokantaan todistamaan poliittista vainoa. Hallinto-oikeus totesi, että itse ostettu tekaistu syyte ei oikeuta turvapaikkaan.
Opiskelija puukotettiin kuoliaaksi äärimmäisen suurella veitsellä jalkapallojoukkueen iltariennojen jälkeen Southamptonissa – oikeudenkäynti käynnissä.
Terroristitutkinnassa oleva henkilö pidätettiin Hampurin yliopistosairaalan (UKE) psykiatrisella osastolla; klinikkahuoneesta löydettiin räjähdysaineiden valmistukseen soveltuvaa lannoitetta.
Dortmundin 'Knappi-jengi' oikeuden edessä: maahanmuuttajataustainen nuorisoryhmä kannusti toisiaan väkivaltaorgioihinsa.
Berliinin Neuköllnin nuorisokeskuksessa tapahtuneen ryöstöraiskauksen jälkeen nuorisostadtratia Nagelia tutkitaan oikeudentukkimisesta (Strafvereitelung) – viranomainen epäillään estäneen tapauksen ilmoittamista muslimijärjestön johtaman nuorisokeskuksen maineen suojelemiseksi.
Saksalais-algerialainen mies tuomittiin 12 vuodeksi vankilaan kidutusrikoksesta: kidutti naista raakuudella.
Irakilainen mies ampui asuntoon, mutta tutkijat vapauttivat hänet. Tapaus herätti kysymyksiä viranomaisten ratkaisuista maahanmuuttajien väkivaltarikoksissa.
22-vuotias marokkolainen, joka luokitellaan 'turvallisesta maasta' tulevaksi, yritti raiskata opiskelijaa Rotterdamissa; pian ennen tätä hän häiritsi nuorta pariskuntaa. Tapaus kyseenalaistaa turvallisen maan -luokittelun käytön.
Berliinissä mies vapautettiin murhasyytetystä poliisivirkamiehen surmaamiseen liittyvässä tapauksessa.
Vankilatuomio miehelle, joka terrorisoi asukkaita ja haavoitti puukolla Almeriassa, Espanjassa.
X posts (23)
- European sexual-crime statistics - growth trends by country
- International crime statistics by nationality - comparative analysis
- Signs in Finland in Arabic and Somali alongside the official languages - criticism of language integration
- Case (content could not be fetched)
- Spanish socialist goes to a kebab restaurant to support Muslims and is assaulted in a homophobic attack
- Woman harassed while walking her dog in Italy; helper injured - anti-immigration comments
- Man shot twice at a drug-dealing location in Venissieux, France
- Helsinki Cathedral: "This is a major provocation. It will not end well."
- Tommy Robinson: "Your new DIEversity neighbours in modern England"
- Ukrainian diaspora members versus anti-Israel activists who smashed a Star of David ambulance in London
- Christian preacher attacked by a Muslim immigrant in Utrecht, Netherlands
- Hezbollah flag in a religious procession in London - sarcasm about multiculturalism
- Australian PM Albanese confronted and shouted out of a mosque in Sydney
- Sadiq Khan holds a record-breaking iftar in Trafalgar Square - Robinson: "colonization event"
- 58 Christian graves vandalized with the text "France belongs to Allah"
- Instagram: case
- Count Dankula - case
- Fake asylum seekers in Madrid occupy African embassies because of documents promised by PM Sanchez
- Mohammed Hijab: "50 million Muslims in Europe - more than in some Muslim countries"
- Norway: Muslims building political power quickly; post claims 20% of the population is enough to take power
- Boko Haram abducts more than 400 women and children in Nigeria and demands a GBP 2.7 million ransom within 72 hours
- Spain regularizes 500,000 illegal migrants while migrant caravans still continue arriving in Ceuta
- Pakistani men storm the Barcelona consulate; "all military-age men, no women or children"
Sexual crimes
Foreign-background persons are substantially overrepresented in sexual offence statistics across Europe. Eurostat data show a 150% rise in reported sexual violence offences across the EU between 2014 and 2024. In Sweden, 63% of convicted rapists have a migrant background.
Eurostat-tilastot osoittavat seksuaalirikosten merkittävän kasvun useissa Euroopan maissa. Espanjassa raiskaukset nousivat 332 % viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana, tekijänä maahanmuutto. EU:ssa kasvu yhteensä +150 %.
Eurostat's statistical overview shows reported sexual violence offences increasing significantly in the EU during 2014–2024.
Eurostat reports that rape reports increased by an EU average of 150%, and by 322% in Spain, over the last decade.
Remix News summarizes Eurostat reporting that sexual offences multiplied in several Western European countries, a trend linked here to immigration.
Finland
Tilastokeskuksen analyysi rikosepäilyistä kansalaisuuden mukaan ikä- ja sukupuolivakioituna (2017–2018): ulkomaalaiset epäiltiin rikoslain rikoksista 1,2-kertaisesti suomalaisiin nähden. Irakilaiset miehet: seksuaalirikoksissa 12,8-kertainen yliedustus. Somalialaiset miehet: huumausainerikoksissa 3,4-kertainen yliedustus. Irakilaistaustaiset: kokonaisrikollisuudessa 2,0-kertainen.
Vertaisarvioitu tutkimus: maahanmuuttajanuorilla korkeampi rikollisuusaste 14:ssä 17:stä mitatusta rikostyypistä. Ero pienin myymälävarkaudessa, ilkivallassa ja kiusaamisessa. Ei merkittävää eroa päihteiden käytössä.
Abroad
Ardavan Khoshnoodin (dosentti, Lund) tutkimus: 63 % Ruotsin raiskaustuomituista on maahanmuuttajataustaisia. Ulkomailla syntyneet, jotka saapuivat Ruotsiin yli 15-vuotiaina, ovat kantaväestöä merkittävästi yliedustettuna tuomioissa.
The Telegraphin uutinen Ruotsin raiskaustuomiotilastoista: lähes kaksi kolmasosaa tuomituista on maahanmuuttajia.
Berliinin viralliset rikostilastot: seksuaalirikokset kasvoivat dramaattisesti ja lähes 40 % raiskaajista on ei-saksalaisia.
Espanjalainen Gaceta raportoi Ruotsin raiskaustuomiotilastoista: lähes kaksi kolmasosaa tuomituista on ensimmäisen tai toisen sukupolven maahanmuuttajia.
Uudet saksalaiset tilastot osoittavat joukkoraiskaajien määrän olevan ennätystasolla – maahanmuuttajat merkittävästi yliedustettuna tekijöissä.
Tanskan viralliset rikostilastot: ei-länsimaalaiset maahanmuuttajat tekevät kolmanneksen raiskauksista ja väkivaltarikoksista.
Ulkomaan kansalaiset tuomittiin 25 %:ssa naisten seksuaalirikoksista Britanniassa.
Lontoon data: noin 40 % seksuaalihyökkäyksistä syytetyistä on ulkomaankansalaisia.
Kanaalin ylitysreitiltä tulleiden ulkomaankansalaisten seksuaalirikostuomiot kasvoivat merkittävästi vuosina 2021–2024.
Brittiviranomaisten virallinen raportti ryhmämuotoisesta lasten seksuaalisesta hyväksikäytöstä – turvapaikanhakijat mukana.
Cases
A 21-year-old Syrian man raped a 13-year-old girl in Tromsø in September 2024 and received just six months. The court cited his low IQ (estimated 41–75) and developmental level comparable to the victim as mitigating factors. Norway had removed the three-year minimum sentence for child rape.
Afsar Safi, 30, arrived by small boat in 2021 and sexually assaulted a seven-year-old girl at a government-funded hotel in West London. His asylum claim revealed Taliban links; it was rejected. He was sentenced to just two and a half years and could be released on licence within six months. He must register as a sex offender for seven years.
Oikeudenkäynti Rochdalessa ja Manchesterissa: tyttöjä pidettiin seksuaalisina orjina vuosikausia – uusi oikeudenkäynti tuo esille laajemman verkoston laajuuden.
Kolme turvapaikanhakijaa tuomittiin syyllisiksi naisen julman raiskauksen yhteydessä rannalla Etelä-Englannissa.
Kaksi afganistanilaista turvapaikanhakijaa tuomittiin Britanniassa teinitytön sieppauksesta ja raiskauksesta.
Ruotsalainen tapaus, jossa useita miehiä tuomittiin järjestäytyneestä seksuaalisesta hyökkäyksestä Skellefteåssa.
Muhammed (24, syyrialainen) ja Khan (23, afgaanilainen) ryöstöraiskaavat nuoren naisen koulun takana Stavangerissa heinäkuussa 2025 – tunnustivat lopulta oikeudessa.
A 35-year-old Islamic religious teacher in Baden-Württemberg was convicted by Ellwangen regional court of sexually abusing eight boys aged 12–17 in 27 separate incidents. He was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison and banned from working with male minors for five years.
A 23-year-old Syrian man attempted to rape a 15-year-old girl in the toilet of an ICE high-speed train in Germany.
An Afghan man is accused of sexually abusing an 11-year-old girl in a school toilet in Germany.
Bangladeshilainen maahanmuuttaja syytetään 17-vuotiaan naisen raiskauksesta Venetsiassa.
ZDF reports on the alleged sexual assault of a 16-year-old at a Berlin-Neukölln youth centre. Authorities are accused of delaying reporting of the incident to avoid damaging the reputation of the Muslim-led centre.
Violent crime
Homicide and knife-crime statistics across Europe show consistent overrepresentation of foreign nationals. In Germany, nearly one in two violent crime suspects is a foreigner. Stabbing attacks, vehicle rammings, and gang violence are disproportionately linked to recently arrived migrant groups.
A broad list of vehicle-related migrant incidents in Europe.
BKA PKS 2025 suspect tables by nationality. Normalised to per 100,000 of each nationality (BKA + Destatis; nationalities with fewer than 5 cases excluded; analysis by @TheRealTom): Lebanon 97.5 – Algeria 89.6 – Tunisia 59.4 – Stateless 58.7 – Gambia 45.2 – Guinea 33.5 – Somalia 32.8 – Morocco 26.9 – Georgia 24.8 – Afghanistan 24.2 – Sweden 24.0 – Albania 21.9 – Moldova 21.3 – Syria 20.2 – Bosnia-Herzegovina 18.9 – Eritrea 18.6 – Colombia 18.3 – Iraq 17.4 – Lithuania 16.7 – Czech Republic 14.2 – Turkey 12.9 – Iran 11.8 – Vietnam 11.7 – Netherlands 11.3 – Romania 11.2 – Germany 2.2. Figures are suspects, not convictions.
In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern there are 1,497 open arrest warrants; 1,134 (75%) concern foreign nationals. For violent crimes, foreigners account for roughly 90% of wanted suspects (74 of 83). Top nationalities sought: Poles (364), Georgians (107), Romanians (75), Ukrainians (68), Tunisians (58). Foreign suspects can more easily evade justice by fleeing to their home countries or into parallel communities.
43.1% of violent-crime suspects in Germany in 2024 were foreign nationals, and roughly 40% of all suspects lacked German citizenship. Welt documents the gap between media portrayal (where foreign suspects appear in up to 94.6% of TV crime reports) and the actual statistical share.
Cases
A 22-year-old asylum seeker was arrested for the murder of 17-year-old Lisa in Amsterdam and was also linked to an earlier rape and sexual assault.
Somali-born Essa Suleiman was charged with attempted murder over the Golders Green attack in London in spring 2026.
Haybe Cabdiraxmaan Nur tuomittiin elinkautiseen puukotusmurhasta Derbyyssä.
Deng Chol Majek syytetty puukotusmurhasta Walsallissa.
Safi Dawood pidätettiin epäiltynä puukotusmurhasta Hillingdonissa, Lontoossa.
24-vuotias libyalainen, joka saapui pienellä veneellä, pidätettiin puukotushyökkäyksestä Eastbournessa, jossa kolme ihmistä loukkaantui.
Opiskelija puukotettiin kuoliaaksi äärimmäisen suurella veitsellä jalkapallojoukkueen iltariennojen jälkeen Southamptonissa.
16-year-old Liana was pushed in front of a train at a German railway station. The Iraqi perpetrator was sentenced to psychiatric detention.
Haastattelussa ukrainalaispakolaisäiti, jonka tytär Liana (16) työnnettiin junan eteen irakkilaisen miehen toimesta – äiti ilmaisee täydellisen pettymyksensä oikeusjärjestelmään.
17-vuotias syyrialainen pidätettiin epäiltynä 19-vuotiaan naisen murhasta lähellä Mannheimin Gartenstadt-kaupunginosaa.
A 19-year-old Afghan man attacked a 41-year-old woman with a knife at the Frankfurt Main riverbank on 10 June 2024, stabbing her multiple times in the head and neck while she sat on a park bench. He was arrested and charged with attempted murder and dangerous bodily harm.
36-vuotias syyrialainen puukotti 33-vuotiasta tupakkapyynnön jälkeen bussipysäkillä Neuköllnissä – uhri kriittisessä tilassa.
A 25-year-old Afghan man stabbed a 46-year-old passenger in the neck with a folding knife on a Dortmund city tram on 11 February 2026, after the victim asked him to lower his voice during a phone call. The attacker fled at the next stop; the victim's injuries were not life-threatening.
45-vuotias marokkolainen hyökkäsi kirveellä kolmeen asukkaaseen Montefrío'ssa – kaksi iäkästä naista kriittisessä tilassa, huusi 'kaikkien kristittyjen on kuoltava'.
22-vuotias afgaanilainen hyökkäsi keittiöveitsellä linja-autoon ja poliiseihin Bergen auf Rügenissä.
Syyrialainen, jonka turvapaikkahakemus oli hylätty, pidätettiin puukkoiskun jälkeen Saksassa.
Terrorism
A number of terrorism plots and attacks in Europe have been carried out by asylum seekers or those who arrived as refugees. Cases span the UK, Germany, and other EU countries and include ISIS supporters, al-Qaeda-linked planners, and Iranian state-directed plots.
Cases
Shah Rahman, part of an al-Qaeda-inspired cell that plotted attacks on the London Stock Exchange, the US Embassy, and Boris Johnson, was released on parole against the Justice Secretary's objections. He received a 12-year sentence, was first freed in 2017, and was recalled in 2022 for breaching conditions.
Hakan Barac tuomittiin ISIS:n tukemisesta Newportissa, Monmouthshiressa.
Mostafa Sepahvand, Farhad Javadi Manesh ja Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori syytetty kansallisen turvallisuuden lain rikkomisesta terrorismiepäilyjen perusteella Westminsterissä.
Iranilainen turvapaikanhakija tutki pommi-iskua Israelin suurlähetystöön Rochdalessa – asui veronmaksajien rahoittamassa talossa.
A 17-year-old Syrian was arrested on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack in Hamburg, Germany.
Junge Freiheit investigates whether the young killer from Memmingen was Islamist-motivated, raising questions about the radicalisation of foreign-background criminals.
German authorities carried out a counter-terrorism raid in Bremerhaven after the New York Police Department passed on a tip about a potential terror threat.
A 22-year-old Syrian asylum seeker admitted in a Berlin court to planning terrorist attacks targeting Germans and Jews. He radicalised through Islamic State content on TikTok within roughly 15 months of arriving in Germany in 2023, and was constructing a suicide vest when arrested in November 2025. Sentencing was set for 5 June 2026.
Berlin's Kammergericht convicted four Hamas members to sentences of 4.5–6 years for maintaining weapons depots in Poland, Bulgaria, and Denmark intended for terrorist attacks. They were arrested in December 2023; the trial began in February 2025.
Terroristitutkinnassa oleva pidätettiin Hampurin UKE-sairaalan psykiatrialla; klinikkahuoneesta löydettiin räjähdysaineiden valmistukseen soveltuvaa lannoitetta.
Domestic violence — perpetrator background
Statistics Finland 2024 data show that foreign-background people are substantially overrepresented among domestic violence suspects relative to their population share. In Espoo, nearly half (45–50%) of domestic violence suspects had a foreign background.
Poliisi ilmaisi huolensa ulkomaalaistaustaisten lähisuhdeväkivaltaepäiltyjen kasvavasta osuudesta. Espoossa noin 45–50 % lähisuhdeväkivallan epäillyistä oli ulkomaalaistaustaisia — kun ulkomaalaistaustaiset ovat noin 22 % Espoon väestöstä.
Vuonna 2024 kirjattiin noin 13 000 lähisuhdeväkivaltarikosta; epäillyistä 76 % miehiä. Tapauksissa, joissa uhri oli ulkomaalaistaustainen, epäilty oli myös ulkomaalaistaustainen 72,1 %:ssa tapauksista (vertailuna: suomalaistaustaisella uhrilla suomalaistaustainen epäilty 88,8 %:ssa). Ulkomaalaistaustaisten uhrien osuus 19 % (2023) ja 18 % (2024) — selvästi heidän väestöosuuttaan (10 %) korkeampi.
Foreign prisoners
The number of foreign prisoners has grown 75% over the past ten years. In 2025, the daily average was 839 foreign inmates — nearly one in four (23.6%) of all prisoners — despite foreign-background people making up approximately 10% of the population. Overrepresentation is 2.5–3×.
Finland
Rikosseuraamuslaitoksen tilastot 2025: ulkomaalaisia vankeja 839/vrk (23,6 % vankilaväestöstä), 78 kansalaisuutta. Kasvua 22 % edellisvuodesta. Suurimmat ryhmät: Viro (112), Irak (65), Ruotsi (64), Albania (44), Liettua (43), Romania (42), Somalia (29). Huumausainerikokset 49,1 % ja seksuaalirikokset 20,6 % päärikoksena.
Vantaan vankilassa 60 eri kansalaisuutta vuosittain; noin 50 % tutkintavangeista ulkomaalaisia. Kansallinen trendi: noin 20 ulkomaalaista vankia vuonna 1990 → 839 vuonna 2025. 75 % kasvu kymmenessä vuodessa.
Ulkomaalaistaustaisia on noin 10 % Suomen väestöstä, mutta 23,6 % vankilaväestöstä. Yliedustus on 2,5–3-kertainen. Ulkomaalaisten vankien määrä kasvoi +22 % vuodessa ja +75 % kymmenessä vuodessa.
Abroad
About 10,487 foreign nationals are held among 87,342 total UK prisoners, costing roughly £629 million a year. One foreign prisoner costs ~£109/day versus £32/day under the Albania returns deal. Over 8,700 foreign offenders were removed since July 2024, a 32% increase.
Military service evasion among foreign-language speakers
Foreign-language men avoid military service at significantly higher rates than Finnish-language men. The pattern raises questions about integration and the equal distribution of civic obligations.
Ilta-Sanomien artikkeli vieraskielisten miesten asevelvollisuuden välttämisestä Suomessa. Vieraskieliset miehet jättävät suomenkielisiä useammin kutsunnat käymättä tai hakevat vapautusta.
Sotilasaikakauslehden artikkeli tarkastelee vieraskielisten asevelvollisten tilannetta, kutsuntaosallistumista ja integraatiohaasteita puolustusvoimien näkökulmasta.
Iltalehden poliittinen uutinen vieraskielisten miesten asevelvollisuuden välttämisestä – aihe on noussut poliittiseen keskusteluun.
Demographic replacement
Demographic replacement is often labelled a conspiracy theory in mainstream media. Regardless of that label, population statistics show substantial demographic change.
Three Yle articles frame demographic replacement as a conspiracy theory, even though demographic statistics show the native population share declining systematically through immigration and fertility differences.
Yle frames the concept of demographic replacement as a conspiracy theory and explains the term after Riikka Purra's speech.
Yle reports on Teemu Keskisarja's A-studio appearance, where he described demographic replacement as real and used language interpreted as discriminatory.
Supo changed its earlier definition linking demographic-replacement theory with terrorism, raising questions about political steering.
Luton is often cited as an example of a town where the native population became a minority. The white share fell from 80% in 1991 to 45% in 2021.
ONS visualization of Luton's demographic change from 1991 to 2021: the white British share fell from about 80% to below 45%.
Wikipedia summary of Luton's rapid demographic diversification, including white British residents becoming a minority by 2021.
Finland
Statistics Finland population projection 2021 (medium scenario): the foreign-language population share is projected to grow from its current ~11–12% to approximately 18–20% by 2040. Since actual net migration in 2022–2025 significantly exceeded the medium-scenario assumptions, the real share may be higher.
Vuonna 2025 Suomen kansalaisuuden sai 14 168 ulkomaalaista — kaikki aikojen ennätys, +23 % edellisestä vuodesta. Suurin ryhmä oli irakilaiset (14 % kokonaismäärästä). Luonnollistaminen tiukentui samaan aikaan: vaadittava asumisaika pidennettiin 5:stä 8 vuoteen.
Abroad
Alankomaiden tilastoviraston CBS:n interaktiivinen väestökojelauta alkuperän mukaan – näyttää maahanmuuttajataustaisten osuuden alueittain ja kehityksen ajan myötä. Havainnollistaa demografisen muutoksen mittakaavan Alankomaissa viralliseen dataan perustuen.
Independent statistics site tracking Finland's population change. It functions independently and is not a link to the main site.
Helsingin Sanomat: the absolute number of people with Finnish background has started to decline while the foreign-language share of the population is growing.
There were 660,800 people with foreign background at the end of 2025, or 11.7% of the population. According to calculations by Professor Matti Viren, the current growth rate would produce 11.8 million by 2060, more than the estimated 4.5 million with Finnish background.
More than 55% of residents in the Havukoski district are foreign-language speakers, an example of rapid demographic change in the Helsinki region.
The Nordic Centre for Spatial Development's map of the foreign-born population share across Nordic countries at municipal and regional level, 2022. Shows the geographic concentration of immigration and regional variation in demographic change.
Germany recorded roughly 654,300 births in 2025 — down 3.4% from 2024, a fourth consecutive annual decline, and the lowest figure since 1946. Deaths totalled around one million, leaving a deficit of approximately 352,000. Eastern German states saw steeper falls (−4.5%). The government proposes increased immigration as a remedy.
X posts (7)
- Sarcelles, France: "You are not in Mali or Algeria, you are in France"
- Nationalism versus multiculturalism
- Elementary-school class photo from Ontario
- "The new third-world France"
- White residents of Luton: 80% (1991) -> 71% (2001) -> 45% (2021)
- Spread of Islam in Finland - concern and call to act, mentioning Oulu
- Marion Marechal on the Islamist threat in Europe
People smuggling and boat arrivals
Illegal migration into Europe is organised through smuggling routes run by criminal networks. UNHCR tracks maritime arrivals officially — the Mediterranean and the English Channel are key routes. Smuggling networks use violence against both migrants and local residents.
UNHCR's official tracking portal for maritime arrivals in Europe since 2016. Includes arrival counts by route, deaths and disappearances, and statistics per receiving country.
The NCA arrested nine HGV drivers in Kent between July and October 2025 for people smuggling. Organized crime groups pay drivers thousands of pounds per trip; sentences range from three to fourteen years.
Two drivers working for an Irish haulage company were violently assaulted in France, with migrants suspected in the attack.
The Guardian collected lorry drivers' experiences from Calais: attacks, threats, and theft by migrants were reported as regular problems.
France 24 reports that gangs on the Calais smuggling routes fight violently over territory, with organized criminal networks using weapons and resources.
Ahmed Ebid organised human trafficking operations from a flat in Hounslow, west London, and was jailed.
Marokkolaiset salakuljettajat opettavat subsaharalaisia siirtolaisia lentämään moottorivarusteisilla varjoliidokkeilla Espanjaan Ceutan kautta – uusi ilmareitit perinteisten maa- ja merireittien rinnalla. Tapaus kuvastaa salakuljetusverkostojen nopeaa taktista kehittymistä.
Muslim population growth
Finland is estimated to have 120,000–130,000 Muslims (approximately 2.3% of the population). Pew Research Centre projects the Muslim population will rise to 190,000 (3.4% of the population) by 2050 in the medium scenario — making Muslims the fastest-growing religious group in Finland.
Finland
- Registered members of Islamic communities: approximately 20,876 (0.37% of the population).
- Estimated actual Muslim population: 120,000–130,000 — many times the registered figure.
- Largest Muslim communities: Helsinki Metropolitan Area, Turku, Tampere.
- Muslims are the fastest-growing religious group in Finland.
International
- Pew estimated Europe's Muslim population at 25.8 million in 2016, or 4.9% of the population.
- Even with no further migration, the Muslim share would rise to 7.4% by 2050 because of age structure and fertility.
- In the medium scenario the share would be 11.2%, and in the high-migration scenario it would be 14.0% in 2050.
- Among migrants who arrived in Europe between 2010 and 2016, an estimated 53% were Muslim; among those granted or expected to be granted refugee status, 78% were Muslim.
- The median age of Muslims was 30.4 years versus 43.8 for non-Muslims; the total fertility rate was 2.6 children for Muslim women and 1.6 for non-Muslim women.
- Finland scenario 2050: ~190,000 Muslims (3.4% of population) in the medium scenario; over 250,000 in the high-migration scenario.
Residential segregation
The share of the foreign-background population is 19–25% in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. At neighbourhood level the gap is sharper: eastern and north-eastern Helsinki concentrates significantly more of the foreign-background population. Segregation is increasing.
Vantaa: 25 % asukkaista ulkomaalaistaustaisia — pääkaupunkiseudun korkein. Espoo: 22 %. Helsinki: noin 19–20 % (yli 134 000 henkilöä). Koko Suomessa ulkomaalaistaustaisia on noin 9–10 % väestöstä.
Vertaisarvioitu tutkimus: etninen ja sosioekonominen segregaatio on kasvanut pääkaupunkiseudulla 2000-luvulla. Lasten segregaatio on vanhempiaan voimakkaampaa. Helsinki on pyrkinyt estämään slummautumista sekoittamalla asuntokantaa, mutta segregaation suunta on silti ylöspäin.
Public opinion on immigration
Finnish attitudes toward immigration are divided: a majority wants stricter immigration policy and believes public debate avoids discussing the problems — while labour-based immigration is broadly supported. The surveys below are the most comprehensive published.
Finland
- 43% of Finns consider the current level of immigration too high; 37% consider it about right.
- 56% support stricter immigration policy; 22% are opposed.
- Support for stricter policy has grown significantly since 2019.
- Opposition to immigration is strongest among older respondents and those living outside cities.
- Concerns about security and labour-market competition are the most frequently cited reasons.
- A majority of Finns (57%) favour tighter immigration restrictions.
- 30% consider the current level of immigration appropriate.
- Only 8% would like to see more immigration.
- Attitudes have hardened notably compared with surveys from the early 2010s.
Humanitarian illusion – the catastrophe of aid
The asylum system is presented as the pinnacle of humanitarian responsibility — a way to save lives and offer protection to the persecuted. Most applicants, however, do not meet the criteria for international protection, the system does not reach the world's poorest, and brain drain leaves source countries worse off than before.
Most asylum seekers do not need protection
The EU asylum system rejects the majority of applications at first instance. In 2025, the first-instance recognition rate was 39% — and in final decisions after appeal, it fell to 21%. Nearly four in five applicants are therefore found by the system's own criteria to have no protection need. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality: Syrians and Eritreans are recognised at high rates, while applicants from many West African, North African, and South Asian countries fall below 10–20%. Applicants also move within the EU towards the countries with the best benefits or highest approval odds — so-called asylum shopping that burdens the Dublin system and places a disproportionate load on southern border states.
About 39% of EU first-instance asylum decisions are positive — in final decisions after appeal the share falls to around 21%. More than half of applicants are therefore found by the system's own criteria to have no protection need. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality: Syrians and Afghans are recognised at high rates, while applicants from many African and Asian countries fall below 10%.
EU member states granted protection status to around 361,000 applicants in 2025 (an 18% fall from the previous year). The first-instance recognition rate was 39.1% — meaning more than 60% of applicants were rejected at first stage. In final decisions after appeal, the recognition rate fell to 20.9%. A large share of those rejected file appeals, clogging the system for years.
Eurostat's official statistics on EU asylum decisions. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality: Syrians (~90%) and Afghans (~70%) are recognised at high rates, whereas applicants from many West African, North African, and South Asian countries fall below 10–20%. There are also significant differences between member states — the same nationality can receive very different outcomes in different EU countries.
Comprehensive academic analysis of European asylum decisions 2003–2017. The average overall recognition rate was ~30% — but formal refugee status under the Geneva Convention was granted to only ~15%. Outside the crisis years 2015–16, more than half of applications were rejected at first instance. Recognition rates vary sharply: high for conflict countries (Syria, Eritrea), below 10% or even below 5% for many African and Asian countries. Hatton notes that many applicants do not meet the strict persecution criteria — findings suggesting a significant share of applications are economically motivated.
MPI's interactive data visualisation of asylum recognition rates in EU and EFTA countries 2008–2017. Shows how sharply approval rates vary both by country and by nationality: the same applicant can receive a completely different decision in different EU countries. This inconsistency suggests decisions are not based solely on the applicant's objective protection need but also on the receiving country's political and administrative practices.
A significant share of asylum seekers move within the EU from the first country of arrival to apply in a country with better benefits or a higher recognition rate. This so-called asylum shopping burdens the Dublin system, places a disproportionate load on southern border states, and undermines solidarity among member states.
Politico analysis of EU efforts to stop so-called asylum shopping — the phenomenon in which asylum seekers move from country to country to apply where benefits are highest or approval odds are greatest. The Dublin Regulation requires claims to be processed in the first country of arrival, but in practice the system does not work: applicants continue their journeys and lodge applications in multiple countries, placing an excessive burden on Mediterranean border states.
Legal analysis of the EU Dublin system. Secondary movements — applicants relocating from the first country of arrival to other member states — are a direct consequence of the Dublin Regulation's failure to build genuine burden-sharing solidarity. Countries with better benefits or higher recognition rates attract more applicants. The problem is structural and cannot be solved by enforcement alone.
In 2016, 181,436 people arrived in Italy by sea (Italian Ministry of Interior statistics). Only 4,808 received formal refugee status under the Geneva Convention — just 2.65% of all arrivals. Of the 123,600 who applied for asylum, 60% (54,254) were rejected. About 57,800 did not apply for asylum in Italy at all but continued to other EU countries. The 2.65% figure uses a strict calculation: it compares Geneva-Convention refugee status with all arrivals, not only applicants. Broader measures that include subsidiary and humanitarian protection produce higher rates — but even then the majority of applications were rejected.
The Italian Ministry of Interior's official immigration statistics portal: the daily cruscotto statistico contains data on sea arrivals, asylum applications, and decisions. This is the primary source cited by Il Sole 24 Ore (April 2017) in reporting that only 2.65% of 2016 arrivals received formal refugee status.
Fact-check of Italian Ministry of Interior (Viminale) statistics. The article works through different calculation methods: strict refugee status vs. all forms of protection, applicants vs. all arrivals. In 2014, about 38% of all sea arrivals applied for asylum in Italy; of those applicants, about 10% received refugee status and about 50% received some form of protection. At the same time, about 62% of applications were rejected. Open Migration criticises the narrow 2.65% figure — yet it confirms the same underlying data.
Genuine refugee flows — such as those registered in UNHCR camps — typically have a broadly balanced gender and age profile of families, women, and children. By contrast, those crossing the Mediterranean to Europe show a clear male majority. According to UNHCR statistics, 58% of those who arrived across the Mediterranean in 2015 were adult men, 17% were women, and 25% were children. Frontex's Annual Risk Analysis reported the figure as high as 74% adult men in 2014. The skewed profile is one key indicator that a large share of the movement is economically motivated rather than purely humanitarian.
UNHCR's official tracking portal for maritime arrivals in Europe since 2016. Includes arrival counts by route, deaths and disappearances, and statistics per receiving country.
The EU border agency Frontex's annual risk analysis. Reports that in 2014 about 74% of those crossing the Mediterranean were adult men, 11% women, and 15% children. During the 2015 crisis peak the composition shifted as the Syrian civil war brought more families, but adult men remained the majority afterwards. Frontex emphasises that mixed flows contain both people genuinely needing international protection and economic migrants.
Eurostat's official database of asylum applicants by age and sex (migr_asyappctza). In December 2025, men aged 18–34 accounted for 38% of all first-time applicants — by far the largest single age-sex group. Historically, the male share was substantially higher during the 2015–16 crisis. The database enables comparison by country and year.
Immigration doesn't help poor countries
Humanitarian immigration does not reach the world's poorest — and structurally cannot. Reaching Europe requires thousands of euros and smugglers; those in extreme poverty cannot afford it. Arrivals are typically from the middle class of their home countries, not the most vulnerable. EU receives around one million applicants per year, but there are 700 million people in extreme poverty — the vast majority of whom cannot even apply for asylum. Those who leave developing countries tend to be the most educated and motivated, meaning immigration drains human capital from the countries that need it most.
The number of asylum applications received by the EU (~1 million/year) is less than 0.15% of the world's 700 million people living in extreme poverty. Globally there are 123 million forcibly displaced people — European asylum channels reach only a fraction of them.
Around 700 million people live in extreme poverty worldwide (below $2.15/day in 2017 PPP). The EU receives about one million asylum applicants per year — less than 0.15% of those in extreme poverty. Immigration cannot mathematically solve world poverty.
Comprehensive overview of global poverty figures by region. Poverty is highly concentrated: the vast majority of those in extreme poverty live in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia — regions from which asylum migration to Europe is proportionately low.
About 997,000 asylum applications were filed in the EU in 2024 (first-time ~912,000). Relative to the world's 700 million in extreme poverty or 123 million forcibly displaced, the European asylum system reaches only a fraction of global need.
At the end of 2024 there were 123.2 million forcibly displaced people worldwide (refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced). The vast majority stay in nearby regions or their own country. Only hundreds of thousands reach Europe each year — the Western asylum system covers barely 1% of global forced displacement.
The EU Asylum Agency's annual report: the EU receives around one million asylum applicants per year — a negligibly small share of the world's 123 million forcibly displaced. The system is designed to handle the margin, not to solve global poverty or displacement.
Africa loses ~20,000 professionals per year to emigration. 36 of the 57 countries with a critical health-workforce shortage identified by the WHO are in Africa. Africa carries 24% of the global disease burden but has only 3% of the world's health workers. Training a doctor costs $20,000–$60,000 — an investment whose benefit is captured by the receiving country.
WHO report: Africa loses ~20,000 professionals per year to emigration. 36 of the 57 countries with a critical health-workforce shortage identified by the WHO are in Africa. Africa carries 24% of the global disease burden but has only 3% of the world's health workers. Training a doctor costs $20,000–$60,000 — an investment whose benefit transfers to the receiving country.
Peer-reviewed Lancet article on the scale and effects of health-worker brain drain. Nigeria's doctor-to-population ratio is only ~3.9 per 10,000 (WHO minimum recommendation: 10 per 10,000). Billions in training investment are lost annually as doctors and nurses are systematically recruited to Europe and the USA.
Stanford summary of the scale and consequences of brain drain: developing countries invest heavily in training healthcare workers who are then recruited to rich countries. Receiving countries save hundreds of millions in training costs while sending countries suffer critical skills shortages.
Analysis of Africa's health-worker losses: a colonial-era pattern continues as educated Africans are systematically recruited to Europe and North America. This worsens already critical resource shortages where the need is greatest.
BMJ article: Nigeria has lost thousands of doctors to emigration — the UK is the largest destination. Nigeria's health sector faces a critical staffing shortage while Europe benefits from its trained workforce. Billions in training investment are lost annually.
Classic study quantifying the scale of brain drain: in many small low-income countries, over 30–50% of university-educated nationals live in OECD countries. A dramatic loss of human capital — developing countries finance training that benefits primarily the receiving rich countries.
Safety at asylum reception centres
Finnish Immigration Service data from 2018 documents violence against reception centre staff and between residents. Up-to-date aggregate statistics are not published openly.
Finland
According to Finnish Immigration Service data, in early 2018 reception centres recorded 10–15 reports per month of violence or threats against staff, and 20–60 reports per month of violence between residents (including self-harm). The figures covered both verbal threats and physical assaults.
Abroad
German Federal Interior Ministry report on crime during the migration crisis. Covers internal security problems at reception centres, violence between residents, and violence against staff. Prepared to assess the consequences of the 2015–16 surge in asylum seekers.
Tutkimus väkivaltasuojelun toteutumisesta Saksan pakolaismajoituksissa. Tunnistaa rakenteellisia puutteita: yksityisyyden puute, ahtaus, riittämätön valvonta ja heikko väkivallan ehkäisy erityisesti haavoittuvassa asemassa olevien (naiset, lapset, LGBTQ+) kohdalla. Väkivalta majoituksissa on yleinen mutta aliraportoitu ongelma.
European Parliament study on safety at reception centres, from the perspective of women and children. Documents sexual harassment and violence in EU reception centres across several member states. Recommends gender-separated accommodation, adequate lighting, and clear reporting channels.
Kansainvälisen GBV Migration -tutkimushankkeen Itävallan maaraportti. Kartoittaa sukupuolistuneen väkivallan esiintymistä maahanmuuttajien majoituksissa: seksuaalinen häirintä, fyysinen väkivalta ja psykologinen painostus ovat yleisiä. Raportissa korostuvat ahtaan yhteismajoituksen riskit ja ilmoituskynnyksen korkeus.